A Critique Of Modern Scientific Methodology From TheVedic Perspective

A Critique Of Modern Scientific

Methodology From The Vedic Perspective

by Kishore Cocceal

About the author

Kishore Cocceal was studying for a PhD in physics at Queen Mary and Westfield College in London. He is an active member of ISKCON's London branch.

Abstract: Some popular misconception about science are outlined, then criticized from a philosophical point of view. An alternative and more viable process for obtaining reliable knowledge based on the Vedic scriptures is then presented.

1. Introduction

"Science is objective. Scientific knowledge is objectively proven knowledge. Scientific theories are rigorously derived from objective facts acquired through unbiased observation and experiment. Subjective considerations have no place in science. Science is the only reliable means to obtain knowledge, or at least the best means ."

This is the typical picture that most people seem to have of the scientific enterprise nowadays. It is strongly reminiscent of that aggressively empiricist theory of knowledge known as logical positivism. An empiricist theory is one who believes that all knowledge is ultimately derived from experience through sense perception. A logical positivist, or logical empiricist, is an extremist who holds that theories and statements only have meaning if they are derived, or can be verified, by means of an observational procedure. Logical empiricism as championed by Bertrand Russell in Cambridge and the Vienna circle in Austria and later pursed by A.J.Ayer in England rose, oddly enough, at a time when remarkable developments in Physics in Quantum Theory and Relativity blatantly rendered such notions inadequate and obsolete. Furthermore, Karl Popper had already conclusively refuted positivism as early as 1934, which was even before Ayer came up with his brand of the theory. Today very few philosophers of science, if any, would subscribe to this extreme view. However it still seems to be very much espoused by the popular media, the lay public and the occasional unthinking scientist.

We shall formalise the above viewpoints in the following postulates:

1. Science without observation.

2. Observation provides a reliable and secure basis for obtaining scientific knowledge.

3. Scientific laws and theories are inferred from such observation by induction.

For apparent reasons we will call the above stance the empirico-inductivist, viewpoint. Following Popper and others, we shall show that this account of science is flawed in all of its assumptions in a fundamental way which simply cannot be reconciled with either actual scientific methodology or factual evidence as provided by numerous instances in the history of science.

2. REFUTATION OF THE EMPIRICO-INDUCTIVIST STANCE A LA POPPER

2.1 THE RELATIVE ROLE AND STATUS OF OBSERVATION AND THEORY

The claim that observation precedes theory can be easily undermined by an appeal to a simple illustrative example. Consider an observationl statement like:

"The electron beam was deflected by the magnetic field". This simple experimental observation presupposes a great deal of theory. To begin with, it is assumed that there is such a thing as an electron and that we can produce beams of electrons by a certain process. It also presupposes that something called a magnetic field exists which modifies the behavior of electrons in its neighborhood. The very experimental set up of course involved a considerable amount of theory from an enormous range of fields. For instance the magnetic field had to be produced assuming some basic laws of electromagnetism. The measurement of the relevant quantities involves further complicated mathematical laws governing the behavior of matter.

Thus we see that observation statements acquire relevance and meaning only when formulated within the context of a particular theory. This is because the concepts they employ are only meaningful within the language of that theory. For example it would make no sense to speak of the force acting on an object without reference to the definition of force as given in Newton's theory of mechanics.

The concept "force" is precise, and so is the observational statement "The force on this object is 10N", only because the underlying theory of Newtonian Mechanics is precise.

To sum up, we have found that the observation process is theory -laden. Hence the premise that observation precedes theory is wrong. Now let us examine a simple consequence of this. Since observation statements presuppose some theory, they are as fallible as that theory. Hence, they do not provide a completely secure basis for scientific knowledge. This undermines the second premise of the inductivist. We will see how this happens more clearly below.

First let us consider how the experimentation process is guided by theory. A popular misunderstanding is that the experiments and observations are performed in an unprejudiced manner. This is quite an absurd proposition. As Popper states:

"Observation is always selective. It needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest,a point of view, a problem." To illustrate this point we can refer to Tycho Brahe's series of observations of the position of the planets to settle the controversy between the new Copernican theory and its precursor, the Ptolemic view of the Earth being at the centre of the Universe. The absurdity of the naive inductivists claim is perhaps more clearly evident by recourse to the following hypothetical and humorous example: Suppose I decided to measure the size of people's big toe in an attempt to make an original contribution to scientific knowledge. This would scarcely be worthwhile enterprise unless someone had come up with a certain theory relating the size of one's big toe to, say, one's lifespan. In Poppers words:...though beetles may profitably be collected, observations may not."

A closely related issue is which observations aare relevant and which are irrelevant in the pursance of some line of investigation. For example, when Henrich Hertz performed his experiments to test Maxwell's electromagnetic theory in 1888, he justifiably ignored a host of logically possible observations such as his weight, the state of the weather, the dimensions of the laboratory and so on, as they were "clearly irrelavant" in the light of the theory which he was testing. In fact, however, one of these factors was very relevant. When Hertz measured the velocity of the radio signals he found that it differed significantly from that predicted by Maxwell's theory. He was never able to solve the problem. Now we know that the radio waves were reflected from the walls of the laboratory and were interfering with his measurements. So the dimensions of the room did matter. This indicates how fallible and incomplete theories lead to faulty observations. The prblem of course was resolved by refining and extending the theory (i.e. allowing for the possibility of radio waves to be reflected and to interfere) and not simply by an appeal to more refined or detailed observations as the naive inductvist would assume.